北约峰会2023联合公报中英文 NATO 2023 Summit Communiqué
点击： 作者：浅谈一二三 来源：今日头条 发布时间:2023-07-20 09:31:44
下方是正文：（涉及中国部分已加背景色标注）
北约受邀国赞同本公报。
1. 在欧洲大陆战争仍在继续之际，我们，北大西洋联盟国家元首和政府首脑，受个人自由、人权、民主和法治等共同价值观的约束，聚集在维尔纽斯，重申我们的立场。在我们的安全以及国际和平与稳定的关键时刻，保持持久的跨大西洋联系、统一、凝聚力和团结。北约是一个防御性联盟。它是就与我们个人和集体安全有关的所有问题进行磋商、协调和采取行动的独特、重要和不可或缺的跨大西洋论坛。我们重申我们坚定的承诺，根据《华盛顿条约》第五条，始终保卫彼此和盟军每一寸领土，保护我们十亿公民，维护我们的自由和民主。。 我们恪守国际法和《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则，致力于维护以规则为基础的国际秩序。这次峰会标志着加强我们联盟的一个里程碑。
二、我们热烈欢迎泽连斯基总统出席北约-乌克兰理事会首次会议。我们期待在本次峰会上与澳大利亚、日本、新西兰、韩国的国家元首和政府首脑以及欧洲理事会主席和欧盟委员会主席进行宝贵的交流。我们还欢迎与格鲁吉亚和摩尔多瓦共和国外交部长以及波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那副外交部长的接触，我们继续就执行北约量身定制的支持措施进行密切磋商。
3. 我们欢迎芬兰成为我们联盟的最新成员。这对芬兰和北约来说都是历史性的一步。多年来，我们作为合作伙伴密切合作；我们现在作为盟友站在一起。加入北约使芬兰更安全，北约更强大。
4. 我们重申对北约门户开放政策和《华盛顿条约》第十条的承诺。每个国家都有权选择自己的安全安排。我们期待着欢迎瑞典成为该联盟的正式成员，并在这方面欢迎北约秘书长、土耳其总统和瑞典总理之间达成的协议。
5. 欧洲-大西洋地区的和平被打破。俄罗斯联邦违反了有助于稳定和可预测的欧洲安全秩序的规范和原则。俄罗斯联邦是对盟国安全以及欧洲-大西洋地区和平与稳定最重大和直接的威胁。一切形式和表现的恐怖主义都是对我们公民安全以及国际和平与繁荣最直接的不对称威胁。我们面临的威胁是全球性的、相互关联的。
6. 战略竞争、普遍的不稳定和反复发生的冲击决定了我们更广泛的安全环境。非洲和中东地区的冲突、脆弱和不稳定直接影响我们和合作伙伴的安全。中华人民共和国（PRC）的野心和强制性政策挑战了我们的利益、安全和价值观。我们仍然愿意与中国进行建设性接触，包括建立互惠的透明度，以维护联盟的安全利益。我们继续面临网络、太空、混合和其他不对称威胁，以及新兴和颠覆性技术的恶意使用。
七、俄罗斯对其非法、无理、无端的侵略乌克兰战争负有全部责任，这场战争严重损害了欧洲-大西洋和全球安全，必须追究其全部责任。我们继续最强烈地谴责俄罗斯公然违反国际法、《联合国宪章》以及欧安组织的承诺和原则。我们现在不会、也永远不会承认俄罗斯的非法吞并，包括克里米亚。俄罗斯的战争罪行和其他暴行，例如袭击平民和破坏民用基础设施，剥夺了数百万乌克兰人的基本人类服务，不能有罪不罚。必须追究所有侵犯人权和违反国际人道主义法行为的责任人的责任，特别是针对乌克兰平民，包括强迫驱逐儿童和与冲突有关的性暴力。卡霍夫卡大坝的毁坏凸显了俄罗斯发动的战争的残酷后果。俄罗斯战争对环境、核安全、能源和粮食安全、全球经济以及全世界数十亿人民的福祉产生了深远影响。盟国正在努力促进乌克兰粮食出口，并积极支持国际社会缓解全球粮食危机的努力。能源和粮食安全、全球经济以及全世界数十亿人的福祉。盟国正在努力促进乌克兰粮食出口，并积极支持国际社会缓解全球粮食危机的努力。能源和粮食安全、全球经济以及全世界数十亿人的福祉。盟国正在努力促进乌克兰粮食出口，并积极支持国际社会缓解全球粮食危机的努力。
八、俄罗斯必须立即停止这场非法侵略战争，停止对乌克兰使用武力，并从乌克兰国际公认边界内完全无条件撤出所有部队和装备，直至其领海。我们敦促所有国家不要向俄罗斯的侵略行为提供任何形式的援助，并谴责所有积极为俄罗斯战争提供便利的人。白俄罗斯的支持发挥了重要作用，它继续提供领土和基础设施，使俄罗斯军队能够攻击乌克兰并维持俄罗斯的侵略。尤其是白俄罗斯，还有伊朗，必须结束与俄罗斯的共谋，重新遵守国际法。
九、我们欢迎联合国大会大力支持促进乌克兰全面、公正、持久和平的努力。我们欢迎并支持泽连斯基总统承诺通过其和平方案制定这种和平的原则。我们致力于实现公正和持久的和平，维护《联合国宪章》的原则，特别是主权、领土完整和独立。我们强调，如果俄罗斯不完全、无条件撤军，这一目标就无法实现。尽管我们呼吁俄罗斯建设性地与乌克兰进行可信的谈判，但俄罗斯并未对公正和持久的和平表现出任何真正的开放态度。
10、我们重申坚定不移地声援乌克兰政府和人民，英勇保卫他们的国家、土地和我们共同的价值观。我们完全支持《联合国宪章》第五十一条规定的乌克兰固有的自卫权。我们仍然坚定地致力于进一步加强对乌克兰的政治和实际支持，因为乌克兰继续在国际公认的边界内捍卫其独立、主权和领土完整，并将继续提供尽可能长的支持。我们欢迎所有致力于向乌克兰提供支持的盟国和伙伴的努力。
11、我们全力支持乌克兰选择本国安全安排的权利。乌克兰的未来在北约。我们重申我们在2008年布加勒斯特峰会上做出的承诺，即乌克兰将成为北约成员，今天我们认识到，乌克兰全面融入欧洲-大西洋的道路已经超越了成员国行动计划的需要。乌克兰与联盟的互操作性和政治一体化日益增强，并在改革道路上取得了实质性进展。根据 1997 年《北约与乌克兰特殊伙伴关系宪章》和 2009 年补充协议，盟国将继续支持和审查乌克兰在互操作性方面取得的进展以及所需的其他民主和安全部门改革。北约外交部长将定期评估调整后的年度国家计划的进展情况。联盟将支持乌克兰在其未来加入联盟的道路上进行这些改革。当盟国同意且条件满足时，我们将能够向乌克兰发出加入联盟的邀请。
12. 乌克兰的安全对盟国和联盟非常重要。为了支持乌克兰进一步融入北约，今天我们商定了一系列扩大政治和实际支持的实质性方案。我们决定建立北约-乌克兰理事会，这是一个新的联合机构，盟国和乌克兰作为平等成员，以促进政治对话、接触、合作以及乌克兰加入北约的欧洲-大西洋愿望。它将提供联合磋商、决策和活动，并将作为北约和乌克兰之间的危机磋商机制。
13. 北约通过综合援助计划继续向乌克兰提供急需的非致命援助仍然是一个优先事项。自马德里峰会以来，盟国和合作伙伴已向 CAP 承诺提供超过 5 亿欧元的资金。为了在短期、中期和长期支持乌克兰的威慑和防御，我们今天同意将共同政策进一步发展为乌克兰的一项多年计划。所提供的援助将有助于重建乌克兰安全和国防部门，并使乌克兰过渡到与北约的全面互操作性。盟国将继续以持续且可预测的方式为联合行动计划提供资金。我们高度欢迎并鼓励合作伙伴做出贡献。
14.俄罗斯加强了在波罗的海、黑海和地中海地区的多域军事建设和存在，并在北极保持了重要的军事能力。俄罗斯更加自信的姿态、新颖的军事能力和挑衅活动，包括在北约边界附近进行的挑衅活动，以及大规模的不经通知和突然演习，继续威胁着欧洲-大西洋地区的安全。在高北地区，其破坏盟军增援和北大西洋航行自由的能力是对联盟的战略挑战。北约和盟国将继续开展必要的、经过调整和协调的活动，包括执行相关计划。
15. 俄罗斯与白俄罗斯深化军事一体化，包括在白俄罗斯部署俄罗斯先进的军事能力和军事人员，对区域稳定和联盟的防御产生影响。北约将保持警惕，并进一步密切监测事态发展，特别是可能向白俄罗斯部署所谓私营军事公司的情况。我们呼吁白俄罗斯停止针对邻国的恶意活动，尊重人权和基本自由，并遵守国际法。
16. 俄罗斯正在对其核力量进行现代化改造，包括其大量战区射程武器库存，并扩大其新颖的、破坏性的双能力运载系统。俄罗斯使用这种双功能系统攻击乌克兰平民和关键民用基础设施是不可接受的。我们谴责俄罗斯宣布打算在白俄罗斯境内部署核武器和核系统，这进一步表明俄罗斯的一再行为破坏了欧洲-大西洋地区的战略稳定和整体安全。我们谴责俄罗斯不负责任的核言论和胁迫性核信号。我们回顾2022年1月3日发表的五核国家领导人关于防止核战争、避免军备竞赛的联合声明。
17. 俄罗斯的行动展现了战略恐吓的姿态，并凸显北约继续需要监测所有这些事态发展并在必要时调整其姿态。盟国将继续密切合作，应对俄罗斯构成的威胁和挑战，并重申俄罗斯使用化学、生物、放射性或核武器的任何行为都将带来严重后果。
18. 俄罗斯加强了针对北约盟国和伙伴的混合行动，包括通过代理人。这包括干涉民主进程、政治和经济胁迫、广泛的虚假信息活动、恶意网络活动以及俄罗斯情报部门的非法和破坏性活动。我们正在增强我们可以使用的工具来对抗俄罗斯的混合行动，并将确保联盟和盟国做好阻止和防御混合攻击的准备。
19. 我们寻求欧洲-大西洋地区以及北约与俄罗斯之间的稳定和可预测性。北约不寻求对抗，对俄罗斯不构成威胁。鉴于其敌对政策和行动，我们不能将俄罗斯视为我们的伙伴。我们关系的任何变化都取决于俄罗斯停止其侵略行为并充分遵守国际法。我们仍然愿意与莫斯科保持开放的沟通渠道，以管理和减轻风险、防止升级并提高透明度。同时，我们将继续磋商和评估俄罗斯政策和行动对我国安全的影响，并以团结和负责任的方式应对俄罗斯的威胁和敌对行动。
20. 我们坚决反对并最强烈地谴责恐怖主义。打击一切形式和表现的恐怖主义对于我们的集体防御至关重要。北约在反恐斗争中的作用有助于实现联盟的所有三项核心任务，并且是联盟 360 度威慑和防御方法的组成部分。盟国将继续坚定、坚决、团结一致地应对这一威胁。作为更好地集体应对这一威胁的更广泛努力的一部分，我们将进一步发展盟国的能力，并继续与击败达伊沙全球联盟和伙伴国家合作，以支持他们的努力并帮助他们建立他们打击恐怖主义的能力。北约还将继续酌情参与
21. 恐怖组织威胁我们人民、部队和领土的安全。他们扩大了网络，增强了能力，并投资了新技术，以提高其影响力和杀伤力。我们将继续采取预防、保护和拒绝相结合的措施，遏制、防御和应对恐怖组织构成的威胁和挑战。今天，我们在常设会议上责成安理会更新北约的反恐政策指导方针和行动计划，并与我们的区域伙伴协商，重新评估北约可以向这一领域的伙伴提供军民援助的领域。我们对恐怖主义及其根源的处理方式符合国际法以及《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则，
22. 北约南部邻国，特别是中东、北非和萨赫勒地区，面临着相互关联的安全、人口、经济和政治挑战。气候变化、脆弱的机构、突发卫生事件和粮食不安全的影响加剧了这些问题。这种局势为包括恐怖组织在内的非国家武装团体的扩散提供了肥沃的土壤。它还可能导致战略竞争对手的破坏稳定和强制干扰。俄罗斯正在加剧这些地区的紧张局势和不稳定。普遍的不稳定导致针对平民的暴力行为，包括与冲突有关的性暴力，以及对文化财产的袭击和环境破坏。它导致被迫流离失所，助长人口贩运和非正常移民。这些趋势带来了严重的跨国和人道主义挑战，并对妇女、儿童和少数群体产生了不成比例的影响。为了应对欧洲-大西洋地区内部和周边地区这些威胁和挑战的深远影响，我们今天责成北大西洋理事会在常设会议上对现有和新出现的威胁和挑战进行全面和深入的反思，并2024 年下一次峰会将提供与我们的伙伴国家、国际组织和该地区其他相关行为体接触的机会。
23. 中华人民共和国公开的野心和强制性政策挑战了我们的利益、安全和价值观。中国采用广泛的政治、经济和军事工具来扩大其全球影响力和投射力量，同时对其战略、意图和军事建设保持不透明。中国的恶意混合和网络行动及其对抗性言论和虚假信息针对盟国并损害联盟的安全。中国寻求控制关键技术和工业部门、关键基础设施以及战略材料和供应链。它利用经济杠杆制造战略依赖，增强影响力。它致力于颠覆基于规则的国际秩序，包括太空、网络和海洋领域。
24. 我们仍然对与中国进行建设性接触持开放态度，包括建立相互透明度，以维护联盟的安全利益。作为盟国，我们正在负责任地共同努力，应对中国对欧洲-大西洋安全构成的系统性挑战，并确保北约有持久的能力保障盟国的国防和安全。我们正在提高我们的共同意识，增强我们的应变能力和准备能力，并防范中华人民共和国的胁迫性策略和分裂联盟的努力。我们将维护我们的共同价值观和基于规则的国际秩序，包括航行自由。
25. 中俄两国不断深化的战略伙伴关系及其相互强化的破坏基于规则的国际秩序的企图与我们的价值观和利益背道而驰。我们呼吁中华人民共和国作为联合国安理会常任理事国发挥建设性作用，谴责俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的战争，不以任何方式支持俄罗斯的战争努力，停止放大俄罗斯指责乌克兰和乌克兰的错误言论。北约支持俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的战争，并坚持《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则。我们特别呼吁中国采取负责任的行动，不要向俄罗斯提供任何致命援助。
26. 2014年，在威尔士峰会上，盟国国家元首和政府首脑商定了国防投资承诺。自那时以来，盟国取得了显着的进步，所有国家都增加了国防开支，进一步发展了部队和能力，并为盟军的行动、任务和活动做出了贡献。然而，正如战略构想所指出的，我们各国现在面临着冷战结束以来比任何时候都更加深刻的安全威胁和挑战。
27. 根据《华盛顿条约》第 3 条规定的义务，我们做出持久承诺，每年将至少 2% 的国内生产总值 (GDP) 投资于国防。我们这样做认识到，迫切需要采取更多行动来可持续地履行我们作为北约盟国的承诺，包括满足长期的主要装备需求和北约能力目标，为北约新的防御计划和部队模式提供资源，以及为北约的行动和任务做出贡献和活动。我们确认，在许多情况下，需要超过 GDP 2% 的支出，才能弥补现有的缺口并满足更具争议性的安全秩序所产生的所有领域的要求。
28.我们承诺将至少20%的国防预算投资于主要装备，包括相关的研发。我们认识到，这一目标应与每年至少占 GDP 2% 的国防开支相结合。我们需要保持我们的技术优势，并继续对我们的部队和能力进行现代化和改革，包括通过创新技术的整合。
29. 我们承诺为北约的全方位行动、任务和活动提供必要的部队、能力和资源。这包括满足威慑和防御的要求，提供实施北约防御计划所需的部队并为北约危机管理行动做出贡献。盟国将确保我们的部队做好准备，并拥有必要的人员、装备、训练、备件、后勤、基础设施和库存。我们致力于提高各国军队的互操作性，包括通过透明地遵守并进一步发展北约标准和原则。
30. 为了拥有必要的能力，联盟需要强大而有能力的国防工业以及有弹性的供应链。联盟内强大的国防工业，包括欧洲更强大的国防工业以及欧洲内部和大西洋彼岸更大的国防工业合作，对于提供所需的能力仍然至关重要。此外，根据我们的承诺、义务和程序，我们将酌情减少和消除盟国之间国防贸易和投资的障碍。
31. 北约是我们集体防御的基础。北约的主要目的和最大责任是确保我们的集体防御，抵御来自各个方向的所有威胁。北约将继续履行三大核心任务：威慑和防御；危机预防和管理；和合作安全。这些是相辅相成的，以确保所有盟国的集体防御和安全。
32. 威慑和防御是联盟的核心，以《华盛顿条约》第五条和持久的跨大西洋关系为基础。我们正在实现北约的现代化，以迎接集体防御的新时代。我们团结一致，承诺并决心战胜任何侵略者，保卫盟军的每一寸领土。
33. 在我们主权决定的指导下，为了应对我们面临的威胁，我们保持警惕，团结一致，确保我们的军队在整个联盟的陆地、空中和海上持续大量驻扎，通过我们的 360 度方法。北约的威慑和防御态势基于核、常规和导弹防御能力的适当组合，并辅以太空和网络能力。它是防御性的、相称的并且完全符合我们的国际承诺。我们将以适当、一致和综合的方式使用军事和非军事工具，以我们选择的方式、时间和领域应对所有对我们安全的威胁。
34. 为了应对急剧变化的安全环境，我们正在加强北约的集体防御，抵御来自各个方向的所有威胁。我们不能低估盟国主权和领土完整受到攻击的可能性。自2014年以来，特别是在2022年马德里峰会上，我们做出了加强姿态的决定，并为加速军事适应制定了明确的轨迹。今天，我们同意采取重大措施，进一步加强北约在所有领域的威慑和防御态势，包括加强前沿防御以及联盟迅速增援任何受到威胁的盟友的能力。我们将全面落实这些措施，不让任何潜在对手有任何可能的侵略机会。我们有：
· 在我们现有的战略和特定领域计划的基础上，制定新一代区域防御计划。这一系列计划将共同显着提高我们威慑和防御任何威胁的能力和战备状态，包括在短时间内或没有通知的情况下，并确保按照我们的 360 度方针及时增援所有盟友。我们的集体防御规划将比冷战结束以来的任何时候都更大程度地与我们的部队、态势管理、能力以及指挥和控制的规划完全一致。我们承诺充分调配并定期执行这些计划，为高强度、多领域的集体防御做好准备。
· 同意我们的国防计划是我们部队组织和北约提出的具体军事要求的主要驱动力，使我们能够更快、更大规模地做出反应。根据马德里峰会上商定的新的北约部队模式，盟国正在提供更多有专门战斗能力的部队，包括高度戒备的部队，提高我们的军事反应能力，并利用区域专业知识和地理位置。我们还在建立一支新的多国、多领域的盟军反应部队，这将为快速应对全方位的威胁和危机提供更多选择。我们致力于充分提供必要的力量和能力。
· 同意加强北约的指挥和控制，以确保其有足够的敏捷性、弹性和人员配备来执行我们的计划。这将提高我们进行演习的能力，管理北约在和平时期以及向危机和冲突过渡期间的态势，以及对全方位任务进行指挥和控制的能力，包括大规模多域集体防御行动，由 SHAPE 及其下属司令部（包括三个能力相当的联合部队司令部）执行。
· 重申我们在马德里峰会上的决定，即在北约东翼部署更多强大的就地战备部队，并在需要时从现有战斗群扩大到旅级部队，并以可靠的快速增援部队为基础，预置装备，加强指挥控制。八个多国战斗群现已就位。我们将继续努力执行这些决定，包括通过在联盟东翼进行强有力的现场演习来展示扩大我们军事存在的能力。我们欢迎盟国不断努力增加其在北约东翼的存在，这进一步增强了可信的威慑和防御。所有这些力量都表明了我们保卫盟军每一寸领土的决心和准备。
· 同意进一步提高北约综合防空和导弹防御的准备、准备和互操作性，特别是通过定期训练和现代防空系统和能力在南空司令部责任区的轮换部署，最初重点放在东侧，从而加强我们的威慑。
· 同意继续在北约数字化转型的支持下开展多域行动工作，这将进一步推动我们的军事和技术优势，加强联盟在陆地、空中、海上、网络空间和太空领域果断行动的能力。
35. 我们欢迎芬兰在全面融入北约威慑和防御方面取得的迅速进展，并同意尽快完成这一进程。
36. 我们需要一个强大而富有弹性的国防工业，能够可持续地满足大幅加强集体防御的需要。我们已经批准了国防生产行动计划及其行动项目。该计划将确保北约在整个联盟内基于透明、公平待遇和包容性参与的原则进行长期参与。通过该计划，并为了支持盟国自身的优先事项，我们致力于利用联盟作为召集者、标准制定者、要求制定者和聚合者以及交付推动者的作用来促进可持续的国防工业能力。这将通过重新紧急关注互操作性和改进物资标准化来支撑，以确保我们的部队能够无缝地协同作战，最初的重点是陆地弹药。
37. 我们强大的军事能力对于北约的威慑和防御至关重要。我们继续对所有领域的先进和可互操作能力进行更多投资，特别强调战斗能力，主要是重型、高端部队和能力。这些将反映北约防御计划和其他任务的要求。我们将确保为这些能力提供资源，以维持所需的高水平准备状态。我们继续提高部队的部署能力、互操作性、标准化、响应能力、部队整合和支持，以便在严苛的环境中开展和维持高强度行动，包括危机应对行动。北约国防规划流程在分担风险和责任方面发挥着关键作用，我们重申致力于提供联盟所需的各自份额的能力，以完成我们的三项核心任务。我们的能力发展计划将确保我们保持技术优势，认识到新兴和颠覆性技术带来的挑战和机遇，同时确保它们的及时整合。我们还决定大幅增加某些决定性战斗弹药的库存。
38. 我们将继续加强并定期锻炼联盟的能力，以迅速增援任何受到威胁的盟友。演习是展示联盟决心和能力的重要方式。我们正在调整和简化我们的决策流程，并提高我们的警报和响应系统的有效性。
39. 我们将单独和集体提供威慑和防御所需的全套部队、能力、计划、资源、资产和基础设施，包括针对拥有核武器的竞争对手进行高强度、多领域作战。因此，我们将加强训练和演习，模拟危机或冲突的常规层面以及对于有关盟国而言的核层面，促进北约在所有领域和整个冲突范围内的威慑和防御态势的常规部分和核部分之间更大的一致性。
40. 我们在国内和北约都加快了努力，以确保SACEUR责任区的启用，包括后勤，并提高我们支持盟军增援和维持进入整个联盟、跨联盟和从整个联盟出发的能力领土，包括通过预先部署弹药和设备。作为SACEUR责任区实施的一部分，我们正在推进燃料供应分配安排方面的工作，因为在欧洲有需要时及时向北约军队提供燃料可以巩固联盟的战备状态和反应能力。我们认识到，变化的安全环境对联盟的集体后勤提出了更加严峻的挑战，我们将做出政治和军事努力来应对这一挑战，认识到可靠的威慑和防御依赖于充足的后勤能力。有效的军事机动性对于实现这一点至关重要，并且需要取得进一步的进展。应努力确保北约和欧盟在军事机动领域采取一致的做法和协同作用。
41. 北约综合防空和导弹防御系统仍然是可靠威慑和防御以及联盟不可分割的安全和行动自由的关键，包括北约加强和提供战略反应的能力。北约 IAMD 在和平时期、危机和冲突时期都是一项重要且持续的使命。北约 IAMD 纳入了所有有助于阻止任何空中和导弹威胁或消除或降低其有效性的措施。该任务以 360 度方式进行，旨在应对来自国家和非国家行为体所有战略方向的所有空中和导弹威胁。
42. 盟军的综合防空反导部署，包括在东翼部署的部署，以应对俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略，以及演习和训练，显示了盟军的团结和决心。根据《战略构想》、2022年在马德里商定的新的威慑和防御态势基准以及新一代防御计划，北约通过提高IAMD的准备程度、响应能力、有效性、互操作性和可用性，继续加强其IAMD的空域。北约和盟国继续改进 IAMD 能力，例如监视、拦截以及指挥和控制。我们将继续考虑日益多样化和具有挑战性的空中和导弹威胁，从简单的无人驾驶飞行器（UAV）到复杂的高超音速导弹。
43. 北约核能力的根本目的是维护和平、防止胁迫和威慑侵略。核武器是独一无二的。只要核武器存在，北约就将仍然是一个核联盟。北约的目标是为所有人创造一个更安全的世界；我们力求为一个没有核武器的世界创造安全环境。北约可能不得不使用核武器的情况极为遥远。任何针对北约使用核武器都会从根本上改变冲突的性质。联盟有能力也有决心让对手付出不可接受的代价，并且远远超过任何对手可能希望获得的利益。
44. 联盟的战略核力量，特别是美国的战略核力量，是联盟安全的最高保障。英法独立战略核力量具有自身威慑作用，对联盟整体安全有重要贡献。这些盟国各自独立的决策中心通过使潜在对手的计算复杂化来发挥威慑作用。北约的核威慑态势还依赖于美国在欧洲前沿部署的核武器。有关盟国提供双功能飞机的国家贡献，以及提供常规部队和军事能力以支持北约的核威慑任务，仍然是这一努力的核心。
45. 北约将采取一切必要步骤，确保核威慑任务的可信性、有效性、安全性和安保性。这包括继续实现北约核能力现代化并更新规划以提高联盟核力量的灵活性和适应性，同时始终行使强有力的政治控制。联盟重申，必须确保有关盟国尽可能广泛地参与北约的核负担分担安排，以展示联盟的团结和决心。
46. 联盟致力于确保所有领域和冲突范围内的能力和活动更加一体化和一致性，同时重申核威慑的独特和独特作用。北约将继续保持可信威慑，加强战略沟通，提高演习有效性，降低战略风险。北约已做好准备并有能力在核危机中遏制侵略并管理升级风险。
47. 导弹防御可以补充核武器的威慑作用；它无法替代它们。北约弹道导弹防御（BMD）的目标和政治原则与2010年里斯本峰会相比没有变化。北约弹道导弹防御纯粹是防御性的，旨在对抗来自欧洲-大西洋地区以外的弹道导弹威胁。盟国仍然致力于全面发展北约弹道导弹防御，追求联盟的集体防御，并为所有北约欧洲人口、领土和部队提供全面覆盖和保护，抵御弹道导弹扩散造成的日益严重的威胁。
48. 北约弹道导弹防御系统以各国自愿捐款为基础，包括美国、欧洲在罗马尼亚、土耳其、西班牙和波兰的分阶段适应性方法资产，以及北约弹道导弹防御指挥和控制系统，这是唯一有资格获得共同资助的组成部分。额外的国家自愿捐款将提供稳健性。我们致力于完成北约弹道导弹防御指挥和控制的其他重要组成部分，这是在达到全面作战能力之前实现下一个重要里程碑所必需的。
49. 通过有效威慑和防御、军备控制和裁军以及有意义和互惠的政治对话实现的战略稳定对于我们的安全仍然至关重要。军备控制、裁军和不扩散为实现联盟的目标做出了巨大贡献。盟国在军控、裁军和防扩散方面的努力旨在降低风险并增强安全、透明度、核查和合规性。我们将追求降低战略风险的所有要素，包括通过对话促进信任建立和可预测性、增进理解以及建立有效的危机管理和预防工具。这些努力将考虑到当前的安全环境和所有盟国的安全，并补充联盟的威慑和防御态势。
50. 军控、裁军和不扩散已经并将继续为实现联盟的安全目标以及确保战略稳定和我们的集体安全作出重要贡献。北约在裁军和防扩散方面长期以来一直发挥着自己的作用。冷战结束后，北约大幅减少了在欧洲部署的核武器数量以及北约战略对核武器的依赖。盟国仍然集体决心维护和支持现有的裁军、军备控制和不扩散协议和承诺。我们将进一步加强军控、裁军和防扩散，将其作为欧洲-大西洋安全的关键要素，同时考虑到当前的安全环境和所有盟国的安全。
51. 俄罗斯违反并有选择地履行其军备控制义务和承诺，导致更广泛的安全形势恶化。我们谴责俄罗斯据称暂停《新削减战略武器条约》，并未能遵守该条约规定的具有法律约束力的义务。我们呼吁俄罗斯恢复全面执行该条约，并采取负责任的行动并建设性地参与减少战略和核风险。我们还谴责俄罗斯决定退出具有里程碑意义的《欧洲常规武装力量条约》，这进一步表明俄罗斯继续无视军备控制，也是破坏欧洲-大西洋安全的一系列行动中的最新一起。盟友敦促俄罗斯履行其承诺和义务，并利用退出前的剩余时间重新考虑其决定。盟国将继续就俄罗斯退出《欧洲常规武装力量条约》的影响及其对联盟安全的影响进行磋商。
52. 《不扩散核武器条约》（不扩散条约）仍然是防止核武器扩散的重要堡垒。它是全球核不扩散体系和裁军架构的基石，是实现核裁军的唯一可靠路径，也是共享和平利用核能和科学技术的国际合作框架。盟国仍然坚定致力于全面实施《不扩散核武器条约》的三大支柱，包括第六条。俄罗斯在《不扩散核武器条约》第十次审议大会上阻挠达成共识是不负责任的。我们呼吁所有《不扩散核武器条约》缔约国在当前《不扩散核武器条约》审议周期中共同努力落实和加强《不扩散核武器条约》。我们强调迫切需要使《全面禁止核试验条约》生效。我们呼吁裁军谈判会议根据裁军谈判会议报告CD/1299及其所载任务，立即开始并早日完成禁止生产用于核武器或其他爆炸装置的裂变材料条约的谈判。我们呼吁所有尚未这样做的国家宣布并维持自愿暂停生产用于核武器或其他核爆炸装置的裂变材料。
53. 北约盟国支持完全按照《不扩散条约》的所有规定，以有效和可核查的方式实现无核武器世界的最终目标，促进国际稳定，并以各国安全不受减损的原则为基础。北约的核负担分担安排始终与《不扩散核武器条约》完全一致。
54. 我们重申，《禁止核武器条约》反对联盟的核威慑政策，并且与其不一致和不相容，不符合现有的不扩散和裁军架构，有可能破坏《不扩散条约》，并且没有考虑到当前的安全环境。TPNW 不会改变我们各国在核武器方面的法律义务。我们不接受任何关于 TPNW 反映或以任何方式促进习惯国际法发展的论点。我们呼吁我们的伙伴和所有其他国家现实地反思该禁止条约对国际和平与安全的影响，包括对《不扩散核武器条约》的影响，
55. 中国正在迅速扩大其核武库并使其多样化，拥有更多弹头和更多先进的运载系统，以建立核三位一体，但未能采取有意义的透明度或诚意努力来实现核军备控制或降低风险。我们反对任何以民用项目为幌子为军事项目生产或支持生产钚的企图，这有损《不扩散核武器条约》的目标。我们敦促中国参与减少战略风险的讨论，并通过提高其核武器政策、计划和能力的透明度来促进稳定。
56. 我们重申伊朗决不发展核武器的明确决心。我们仍然对伊朗核计划升级深表关切。我们呼吁伊朗立即履行《不扩散核武器条约》保障协定规定的法律义务和核不扩散政治承诺。伊朗履行这些义务和承诺对于原子能机构能够为伊朗核计划的和平性质提供可信保证至关重要。我们还呼吁伊朗停止一切不符合联合国安理会第2231号决议的弹道导弹活动。
57、我们最强烈地谴责朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹计划，这些计划违反了联合国安理会多项决议。我们重申，朝鲜必须以完全、可核查和不可逆转的方式放弃核武器和现有核计划，以及任何其他大规模杀伤性武器和弹道导弹计划。我们敦促朝鲜重返并充分遵守《不扩散核武器条约》和国际原子能机构的保障监督措施。我们呼吁朝方接受日、美、韩等有关各方多次提出的对话提议。
58. 敌对国家和非国家行为体可能对北约使用化学、生物、放射性和核材料或武器，这仍然是对我们安全的一个核心且不断变化的威胁。我们正在执行马德里峰会上商定的北约新的核生化防务政策，并投资于在任何环境下有效作战、作战和获胜所需的军事能力，并确保我们的国家和集体抵御核生化风险和威胁的能力。
59. 北约利用政治和军事手段保障其所有成员国的自由和安全。不断变化的安全环境越来越要求北约采取结构化和量身定制的方法，在和平、危机和冲突的整个过程中以深思熟虑、一致和持续的方式使用非军事和军事工具。北约使用各种非军事工具来支持联盟的三项核心任务。它还继续充当一个平台，以加强盟国在自己的权力和控制下以及与其他国际行为者一起协调一致地使用这些工具。我们将继续加强有效、清晰、令人信服的战略沟通。
60. 由于欧洲战争从根本上改变了欧洲-大西洋安全环境的性质，对情报的重视对于联盟决策和战略规划变得更加突出和重要。北约情报事业的价值首先来自于盟军情报和安全部门的密切合作，共享情报并继续确保联盟对全球战略图景有全面的了解。为此，盟国的情报能力将有助于提高北约对威胁、风险和挑战的理解，并优化我们重要且多样化的分析能力。我们将酌情加强联盟内部以及与合作伙伴的情报合作。
61. 国家和集体的复原力是可靠的威慑和防御以及有效履行联盟核心任务的重要基础，对于我们努力保护我们的社会、我们的人民和我们的共同价值观至关重要。复原力是植根于《华盛顿条约》第 3 条的国家责任和集体承诺。今天，我们就 2023 年联盟复原力目标达成一致。我们以 2021 年强化复原力承诺为基础。复原力目标将加强北约和盟国应对战略冲击和破坏的准备。它们将提高我们的国家和集体能力，以确保政府的连续性和为人民提供基本服务，并在和平、危机和冲突中为军事行动提供民间支持。盟友将利用这些目标来指导制定符合各自国家风险状况的国家目标和实施计划。我们还将努力识别和减轻战略脆弱性和依赖性，包括在我们的关键基础设施、供应链和卫生系统方面。盟友还应促进社会复原力。在我们加强努力建设抵御能力的同时，我们将继续与从事类似努力的伙伴合作，特别是欧盟，以使欧洲-大西洋地区和我们更广泛的邻国更加安全。各个盟国在其他国际机构中的行动、承诺和法律义务也有助于增强我们的复原力。符合各自国家的风险状况。我们还将努力识别和减轻战略脆弱性和依赖性，包括在我们的关键基础设施、供应链和卫生系统方面。盟友还应促进社会复原力。在我们加强努力建设抵御能力的同时，我们将继续与从事类似努力的伙伴合作，特别是欧盟，以使欧洲-大西洋地区和我们更广泛的邻国更加安全。各个盟国在其他国际机构中的行动、承诺和法律义务也有助于增强我们的复原力。符合各自国家的风险状况。我们还将努力识别和减轻战略脆弱性和依赖性，包括在我们的关键基础设施、供应链和卫生系统方面。盟友还应促进社会复原力。在我们加强努力建设抵御能力的同时，我们将继续与从事类似努力的伙伴合作，特别是欧盟，以使欧洲-大西洋地区和我们更广泛的邻国更加安全。各个盟国在其他国际机构中的行动、承诺和法律义务也有助于增强我们的复原力。包括我们的关键基础设施、供应链和卫生系统。盟友还应促进社会复原力。在我们加强努力建设抵御能力的同时，我们将继续与从事类似努力的伙伴合作，特别是欧盟，以使欧洲-大西洋地区和我们更广泛的邻国更加安全。各个盟国在其他国际机构中的行动、承诺和法律义务也有助于增强我们的复原力。包括我们的关键基础设施、供应链和卫生系统。盟友还应促进社会复原力。在我们加强努力建设抵御能力的同时，我们将继续与从事类似努力的伙伴合作，特别是欧盟，以使欧洲-大西洋地区和我们更广泛的邻国更加安全。各个盟国在其他国际机构中的行动、承诺和法律义务也有助于增强我们的复原力。
62. 联盟完成核心任务的能力越来越依赖于数字技术的采用。认识到数字化转型联盟的紧迫性，我们批准了一项数字化转型实施战略，以增强我们进行多域行动、推动跨所有域的互操作性、增强态势感知、政治协商和采用数据驱动决策的能力。
63. 新兴和颠覆性技术（EDT）既带来机遇，也带来风险。它们正在改变冲突的性质，获得更大的战略重要性并成为全球竞争的关键领域。在俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的战争背景下，EDT以及在当前行动中获取和采用商业技术的作战重要性得到了强调。北约的战略竞争对手和潜在对手正在大力投资高效技术，特别是在恶性混合活动中，并在冲突中发挥决定性作用。我们正在加紧努力，确保联盟在新兴和颠覆性技术方面保持技术优势，以保持我们的互操作性和军事优势，包括通过军民两用解决方案。我们正在共同努力采用和整合新技术，与私营部门合作，保护我们的创新生态系统，制定标准，并致力于体现我们民主价值观和人权的负责任使用原则。我们将确保我们的行为符合国际法并寻求建立公众信任。北约北大西洋国防创新加速器（DIANA）现已向北约国家的初创企业发起首个挑战。为了进一步发展我们的跨大西洋创新生态系统，世界上第一个多主权风险投资基金北约创新基金将在未来几个月开始投资深度科技。作为最近商定的人工智能和自主战略的补充，北约将为关键的新兴和颠覆性技术制定进一步的战略，
64. 我们继续面临来自国家和非国家行为者日益增长的混合威胁和挑战，他们利用混合活动，包括通过干预和有害使用技术来针对我们的政治机构、我们的关键基础设施、我们的社会、我们的民主制度、我们的经济以及我们公民的安全。我们仍然团结一致，捍卫我们开放和民主的社会免受这些恶意活动的侵害。我们重申，针对盟国的混合行动可能达到武装攻击的程度，并可能导致安理会援引《华盛顿条约》第五条。我们将继续准备、威慑、防御和反击混合威胁，包括可能部署反混合支持小组。我们继续制定全面的预防和应对方案，并随时准备应用它们来增强抵御能力并阻止恶意行为者参与混合行动。个别盟友可以在适当的时候考虑对混合活动进行归因并以协调的方式做出反应，承认归因是主权国家的特权。我们将继续解决虚假信息和错误信息，包括通过积极有效的战略沟通。我们还将继续支持我们的合作伙伴增强应对混合挑战的应变能力。承认归属是一项主权国家特权。我们将继续解决虚假信息和错误信息，包括通过积极有效的战略沟通。我们还将继续支持我们的合作伙伴增强应对混合挑战的应变能力。承认归属是一项主权国家特权。我们将继续解决虚假信息和错误信息，包括通过积极有效的战略沟通。我们还将继续支持我们的合作伙伴增强应对混合挑战的应变能力。
65. 对重要海底基础设施的威胁是真实存在的，而且还在不断发展。我们致力于识别和减轻我们关键基础设施的战略漏洞和依赖性，并准备、阻止和防御国家和非国家行为者强制使用能源和其他混合策略。任何针对盟国关键基础设施的蓄意攻击都将得到团结和坚决的回应；这也适用于关键的海底基础设施。保护盟国领土上的重要海底基础设施仍然是国家责任，也是集体承诺。北约随时准备在盟国提出要求时提供支持。我们同意在北约海事司令部（MARCOM）内建立北约海事中心，负责关键海底基础设施的安全。我们还同意建立一个网络，将北约、盟国、私营部门和其他相关参与者聚集在一起，以改善信息共享和交流最佳实践。
66. 网络空间始终存在争议，因为威胁行为者越来越多地试图通过恶意网络活动和活动来破坏联盟的稳定。俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争凸显了网络在现代冲突中的重要地位。我们正在应对实质性、持续性和日益增加的网络威胁，包括对我们的民主制度和关键基础设施的威胁，以及它们属于混合活动的一部分。我们决心利用全方位的能力来威慑、防御和反击全方位的网络威胁，包括考虑采取集体应对措施。单一或累积的恶意网络活动可能达到武装攻击的程度，并可能导致北大西洋理事会援引《华盛顿条约》第 5 条，视具体情况而定。我们仍然致力于按照国际法行事，包括《联合国宪章》、国际人道主义法和适用的国际人权法。我们继续促进自由、开放、和平和安全的网络空间，并通过确保国际法得到尊重和支持网络空间中负责任的国家行为的自愿规范，进一步努力增强稳定并减少冲突风险。今天，我们赞同一个新概念，以增强网络防御对我们整体威慑和防御态势的贡献。它将进一步整合北约的三个网络防御层面——政治、军事和技术——确保在和平时期、危机和冲突期间始终保持军民合作，并酌情与私营部门接触。这样做将增强我们共同的态势感知。加强我们的网络弹性是使我们的联盟更加安全并能够更好地减轻网络威胁造成的重大损害的关键。今天，我们重申并加强我们的网络防御承诺，并致力于实现雄心勃勃的新国家目标，以进一步加强我们的国家网络防御为优先事项，包括关键基础设施。我们启动了北约新的虚拟网络事件支持能力（VCISC），以支持国家应对重大恶意网络活动的缓解工作。这为盟友提供了额外的援助工具。我们将进一步寻求适当发展互利和有效的伙伴关系，包括与伙伴国家、国际组织、工业界和学术界、进一步努力加强网络空间的国际稳定。作为对现有交流的补充，我们将于今年 11 月在柏林举行首届全面的北约网络防御会议，汇聚政治、军事和技术层面的决策者。
67. 空间对于我们各国的安全和繁荣发挥着关键作用。太空也是一个竞争日益激烈的领域，其特点是不负责任的行为、恶意活动以及北约潜在对手和战略竞争对手的太空对抗能力的增强。保持安全使用和不受限制地进入太空是有效威慑和防御的关键。作为我们将太空作为作战领域的工作的一部分，我们正在加速将太空纳入和平时期、危机和冲突期间的联合和多域行动的规划、演习和执行中，以确保太空效应在所有领域之间得到协调。我们致力于加强北约内部空间数据、产品和服务的共享，以支持联盟的要求和防御计划。我们欢迎联盟持续太空监视（APSS）多国计划的持续努力，该计划将提高北约的情报、监视和侦察能力。我们欢迎在法国设立北约航天卓越中心。盟国致力于维护国际法，我们将继续支持国际社会通过促进负责任太空行为的规范、规则和原则来减少太空威胁的努力。我们重申，来自太空或太空内部的敌对行动可能达到武装攻击的程度，并可能导致北大西洋理事会援引《华盛顿条约》第 5 条。我们欢迎在法国设立北约航天卓越中心。盟国致力于维护国际法，我们将继续支持国际社会通过促进负责任太空行为的规范、规则和原则来减少太空威胁的努力。我们重申，来自太空或太空内部的敌对行动可能达到武装攻击的程度，并可能导致北大西洋理事会援引《华盛顿条约》第 5 条。我们欢迎在法国设立北约航天卓越中心。盟国致力于维护国际法，我们将继续支持国际社会通过促进负责任太空行为的规范、规则和原则来减少太空威胁的努力。我们重申，来自太空或太空内部的敌对行动可能达到武装攻击的程度，并可能导致北大西洋理事会援引《华盛顿条约》第 5 条。
68. 能源安全对我们的共同安全具有重要作用。俄罗斯故意加剧的能源危机凸显了稳定可靠的能源供应以及路线、供应商和来源多元化的重要性。我们将继续发展北约支持国家当局保护关键能源基础设施的能力。我们致力于确保为我们的军队提供安全、有弹性和可持续的能源供应。当我们调整我们的联盟以适应正在进行的能源转型时，我们将确保军事能力、有效性和互操作性。盟国正在并将继续寻求符合其需求和条件的能源供应多元化。
69. 气候变化是一项决定性挑战，对当代和子孙后代面临的盟军安全产生深远影响。它仍然是一个威胁倍增器。北约致力于成为了解和适应气候变化对安全影响方面领先的国际组织。我们将继续解决气候变化对国防和安全的影响，包括通过开发创新的战略分析工具。我们将把气候变化考虑纳入北约的所有核心任务中，调整我们的基础设施、军事能力和技术，确保适应未来作战环境的能力。为减缓气候变化做出贡献，我们致力于大幅减少北约政治和军事结构及设施的温室气体排放；我们还将通过提高能源效率、转向清洁能源以及利用创新的下一代清洁技术，为应对气候变化做出贡献，同时确保军事效力以及可信的威慑和防御态势。我们将继续加强与伙伴国家、科学界以及其他活跃在气候变化和安全领域的国际和地区组织的交流。我们欢迎在蒙特利尔设立北约气候变化与安全卓越中心。利用创新的下一代清洁技术，同时确保军事效力和可靠的威慑和防御态势。我们将继续加强与伙伴国家、科学界以及其他活跃在气候变化和安全领域的国际和地区组织的交流。我们欢迎在蒙特利尔设立北约气候变化与安全卓越中心。利用创新的下一代清洁技术，同时确保军事效力和可靠的威慑和防御态势。我们将继续加强与伙伴国家、科学界以及其他活跃在气候变化和安全领域的国际和地区组织的交流。我们欢迎在蒙特利尔设立北约气候变化与安全卓越中心。
70. 我们致力于将人类安全和妇女、和平与安全议程纳入我们所有的核心任务。我们将继续努力通过强有力的政策和明确的行动指导方针全面落实这一目标，以提高我们的行动效率并确保民事和军事结构之间的协同作用。为此，我们正在与合作伙伴、国际组织和民间社会合作。我们重申对雄心勃勃的人类安全议程的承诺。我们的人类安全方针和指导原则使我们能够对人类环境形成更全面的看法，为持久和平与安全做出贡献。今天，我们批准了北约关于儿童与武装冲突的政策以及更新后的打击人口贩运政策。
71. 我们认识到妇女充分、平等和有意义地参与和平与稳定的各个方面至关重要，并注意到冲突对妇女和女童造成的过度影响，包括与冲突有关的性暴力。我们将始终如一地继续执行我们的妇女、和平与安全政策，在此背景下，我们将促进性别平等，融入性别观点，并促进联合国安理会在 2017 年制定的妇女、和平与安全议程的原则。我们所做的一切，包括北约的行动、使命、活动以及我们应对新挑战的工作。我们将评估和更新北约关于妇女、和平与安全的政策。
72. 北约的伙伴关系现在并将继续对于北约的工作方式至关重要。它们在支持北约的三项核心任务和我们的 360 度安全方法方面发挥着重要作用。我们感谢我们的合作伙伴对北约的态势感知、行动、任务和活动（包括信托基金项目）做出的重大贡献。当前的安全环境凸显了伙伴关系的重要性。它们对于保护全球公共资源和增强我们的抵御能力至关重要。我们将加强与在维护基于规则的国际秩序方面与联盟有着共同价值观和利益的合作伙伴的联系。我们将在相互尊重、互惠互利、维护盟友和伙伴利益的基础上，继续加强与伙伴的政治对话和务实合作。这有助于我们境外的稳定并增强我们国内的安全。我们将加强与更广泛的邻国和全球各国的联系，并保持与任何国家或组织接触的开放态度，只要这样做可以加强我们的共同安全。我们仍然致力于支持我们与伙伴关系的原则，并采取措施使我们的伙伴关系更具战略性、更加一致和更加有效。我们将讨论应对影响北约利益的全球安全挑战的共同方法，通过更深入的政治参与分享观点，并寻求具体的合作领域以解决共同的安全关切。根据我们的综合方法行动计划，我们将继续追求北约自身工具和工作链的一致性，
73. 欧洲联盟仍然是北约独特且重要的合作伙伴。我们的战略伙伴关系对于我们两国和欧洲大西洋地区的安全与繁荣至关重要。它建立在我们共同的价值观、我们应对共同挑战的决心以及我们对促进和维护和平、自由与繁荣的明确承诺之上。北约认识到更强大、更有能力的欧洲防御的价值，这对跨大西洋和全球安全做出积极贡献，并且与北约相互补充和互操作。发展连贯、互补和可互操作的防御能力，避免不必要的重复，是我们共同努力使欧洲-大西洋地区更安全的关键。这些努力，包括最近的事态发展，将导致北约更加强大，有助于加强我们的共同安全，有助于跨大西洋负担分担，帮助提供所需的能力，并支持国防开支的总体增加。非欧盟盟国继续为欧盟加强应对共同安全挑战的能力做出重大贡献。对于北约和欧盟之间的战略伙伴关系来说，非欧盟盟国充分参与欧盟的防务工作至关重要。我们期待在这一领域采取共同步骤，取得切实进展，以支持加强战略伙伴关系。我们全面重申有关北约和欧盟合作的所有决定、原则和承诺。我们将本着充分相互开放、透明、互补和尊重各组织不同使命的精神，继续进一步加强这种伙伴关系，
74. 在俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的战争背景下，北约与欧盟的合作变得更加重要。我们在发挥互补、连贯和相辅相成的作用方面明确展示了统一的目标和共同的决心。北约和欧盟将继续支持乌克兰。在这方面，我们欢迎建立专门的北约-欧盟乌克兰问题工作人员协调机制。我们还在战略沟通方面取得了实实在在的成果，包括打击虚假信息、应对混合威胁和网络威胁、演习、作战合作、国防能力、国防工业和研究、反恐以及国防和安全能力建设。我们正在进一步扩大在复原力、关键基础设施保护、新兴和颠覆性技术、空间、气候变化的安全影响以及地缘战略竞争。我们还将继续应对中国对欧洲-大西洋安全构成的系统性挑战。北约与欧盟之间的政治对话对于推进北约-欧盟合作仍然至关重要。
75. 西巴尔干地区对北约来说是一个具有战略重要性的地区，我们悠久的合作和行动历史就凸显了这一点。我们仍然坚定致力于西巴尔干地区的安全与稳定，支持促进该地区国家各自的北约和欧盟愿望的改革。我们将继续加强政治对话和务实合作，以支持改革、地区和平与安全，并对抗国家和非国家行为体造成的恶意影响，包括虚假信息、混合威胁和网络威胁。该地区需要联盟和国际社会的持续关注和承诺来应对这些挑战。民主价值观、法治、国内改革、
76. 北约根据《波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那和平总框架协定》和其他相关国际协定，坚决支持稳定和安全的波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的主权和领土完整。我们鼓励国内和解，并敦促政治领导人不要发表分裂和分裂主义言论和行动。我们仍然致力于实现该国的欧洲-大西洋愿景。我们继续支持改革努力，包括通过新商定的国防能力建设一揽子计划、北约萨拉热窝总部、广泛的合作安全和伙伴关系工具，以及通过该国与北约的改革计划。我们鼓励波黑利用北约支持，加大力度推动重点领域改革取得进展，
77. 加强北约-塞尔维亚关系将有利于北约、塞尔维亚和整个地区。我们期待塞尔维亚以建设性方式与北约及其邻国接触，包括就北约与塞尔维亚合作的互惠互利进行公开沟通。我们支持欧盟推动的对话等旨在实现贝尔格莱德和普里什蒂纳关系正常化的努力，敦促双方抓住时机，真诚致力于达成持久政治解决方案。我们呼吁双方立即降级，恢复对话，建设性地参与落实贝尔格莱德和普里什蒂纳最近在布鲁塞尔和奥赫里德达成的关于正常化道路的协议。
78. 我们仍然致力于北约继续参与科索沃事务，包括通过北约领导的驻科部队（驻科部队）。驻科部队将继续根据联合国安理会第1244号决议在科索沃提供安全可靠的环境和行动自由。最近的升级行动是不可接受的，我们谴责科索沃北部的暴力以及造成北约士兵严重受伤的无端袭击。我们增加了驻科部队的兵力以应对经常出现的紧张局势。我们在驻科部队的兵力态势的任何变化都将根据具体情况而定，而不是受日程驱动。
79. 黑海地区对联盟具有战略重要性。俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略战争进一步凸显了这一点。我们强调，我们将继续支持盟国旨在维护黑海地区安全、保障、稳定和航行自由的区域努力，包括酌情通过 1936 年《蒙特勒公约》。我们将进一步监测和评估该地区的事态发展，并增强我们的态势感知，特别关注我们的安全面临的威胁以及酌情与该地区伙伴进行更密切合作的潜在机会。
80. 我们重申支持格鲁吉亚在国际公认边界内的领土完整和主权。我们坚定支持格鲁吉亚在不受外来干涉的情况下决定自己未来和外交政策路线的权利。我们呼吁俄罗斯未经格鲁吉亚同意撤回在格鲁吉亚驻军。我们还呼吁俄罗斯撤销对格鲁吉亚阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯地区的承认；结束这些地区的军事化，并继续试图通过修建类似边界的障碍，强行将这些地区与格鲁吉亚其他地区分开；并停止侵犯和践踏人权，包括任意拘留和骚扰格鲁吉亚公民。我们高度赞赏格鲁吉亚对北约行动的巨大贡献，这表明了其为欧洲-大西洋安全做出贡献的承诺和能力。我们将继续致力于充分利用北约－格鲁吉亚委员会和年度国家计划，深化同格鲁吉亚的政治对话和务实合作。我们重申2008年布加勒斯特峰会作出的决定，即格鲁吉亚将成为联盟成员，并将成员行动计划（MAP）作为该进程的组成部分；我们重申该决定以及后续决定的所有内容。我们欢迎在实施强化的北约-格鲁吉亚一揽子计划方面取得的进展，包括危机管理、网络安全、军事工程和安全通信，以及在化学、生物、放射性和核（CBRN）防御和安全领域的新举措。培训设施。
81. 我们重申支持摩尔多瓦共和国在国际公认边界内的领土完整和主权，并呼吁俄罗斯在未经摩尔多瓦同意的情况下撤出驻扎在德涅斯特河沿岸地区的所有部队。我们坚定支持摩尔多瓦在不受外来干涉的情况下决定自己未来和外交政策走向的权利，并充分尊重摩尔多瓦的宪法中立性。鉴于安全环境不断恶化，北约正在加大政治和实际支持，以增强其韧性并维护其政治独立。盟国欢迎摩尔多瓦推动民主改革的努力，并致力于支持摩尔多瓦推进欧洲一体化。
82. 中东和非洲是具有战略利益的地区。我们将深化与地中海对话和伊斯坦布尔合作倡议的长期合作伙伴的政治接触和公共外交外展。我们还将加强与相关区域组织的联系，包括非洲联盟和海湾合作委员会。我们正在为伊拉克、约旦、毛里塔尼亚和突尼斯实施国防能力建设一揽子计划。我们还将与约旦当局探讨在安曼设立北约联络处的可能性。
83. 北约和盟国仍然致力于支持伊拉克及其稳定该国的能力。我们认可伊拉克政府和伊拉克安全部队为打击伊斯兰国/达伊沙所做的持续努力和取得的进展。我们鼓励伊拉克在打击一切形式和表现的恐怖主义方面取得进一步进展。我们的北约驻伊拉克特派团继续向大巴格达地区的伊拉克安全机构提供非战斗咨询和能力建设支持，并加深了与伊拉克国防部的合作。根据伊拉克政府的要求，我们正在考虑扩大北约伊拉克任务范围，将其发展为向伊拉克内政部提供有关联邦警察的建议。北约驻伊拉克特派团将继续以需求为导向，
84. 伊朗支持俄罗斯侵略乌克兰的战争对欧洲-大西洋安全产生影响。我们呼吁伊朗停止对俄罗斯的军事支持，特别是停止转让无人驾驶飞行器，这些飞行器被用来攻击关键基础设施，造成广泛的平民伤亡。我们对伊朗在盟国境内的恶意活动表示严重关切。我们还呼吁伊朗避免采取扣押海船等破坏稳定的行动，并为促进地区稳定与和平发挥建设性作用。
85. 印度-太平洋地区对北约非常重要，因为该地区的事态发展可直接影响欧洲-大西洋安全。我们欢迎澳大利亚、日本、新西兰和韩国等亚太地区合作伙伴为欧洲大西洋安全做出的贡献，包括他们对支持乌克兰的承诺。我们将进一步加强对话与合作，应对我们共同的安全挑战，包括网络防御、技术和混合领域的挑战，并以我们对维护国际法和基于规则的国际秩序的共同承诺为基础。
86. 北约与联合国、欧安组织和非洲联盟等其他国际和区域组织的接触有助于国际安全。我们将加强这些互动，以促进我们的共同利益。我们正在探讨在日内瓦设立联络处的可能性，以进一步加强我们与联合国和其他相关国际组织的接触。
87. 我们将确保我们的政治决策拥有充足的资源。我们将在已取得的进展的基础上再接再厉，确保增加的国防开支和北约共同资金能够应对更有争议的安全秩序的挑战。
88. 我们向所有为我们的集体安全不懈努力的妇女和男子致敬，向所有为保护我们的安全而付出最终代价或受伤的人们及其家人表示敬意。
89. 北约仍然是历史上最强大的联盟。一如既往，我们将经受住时间的考验，捍卫盟友的自由与安全，为和平与安全做出贡献。
90. 我们对立陶宛共和国的盛情款待表示感谢。我们期待于 2024 年在华盛顿特区再次举行联盟成立 75 周年会议，随后于 2025 年在荷兰举行会议。
The NATO Invitee associates itself with this Communiqué.
1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, bound by shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, have gathered in Vilnius as war continues on the European continent, to reaffirm our enduring transatlantic bond, unity, cohesion, and solidarity at a critical time for our security and international peace and stability. NATO is a defensive Alliance. It is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters related to our individual and collective security. We reaffirm our iron-clad commitment to defend each other and every inch of Allied territory at all times, protect our one billion citizens, and safeguard our freedom and democracy, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to ensure our collective defence from all threats, no matter where they stem from, based on a 360-degree approach, to fulfil NATO’s three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. We adhere to international law and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and are committed to upholding the rules-based international order. This Summit marks a milestone in strengthening our Alliance.
2. We warmly welcome President Zelenskyy to the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council. We look forward to our valuable exchanges with the Heads of State and Government of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission at this Summit. We also welcome the engagements with the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we continue to consult closely on the implementation of NATO’s tailored support measures.
3. We welcome Finland as the newest member of our Alliance. This is an historic step for Finland and for NATO. For many years, we worked closely as partners; we now stand together as Allies. NATO membership makes Finland safer, and NATO stronger.
4. We reaffirm our commitment to NATO’s Open Door policy and to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Every nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. We look forward to welcoming Sweden as a full member of the Alliance and, in this regard, welcome the agreement reached between the NATO Secretary General, the President of Türkiye, and the Prime Minister of Sweden.
5. Peace in the Euro-Atlantic area has been shattered. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity. The threats we face are global and interconnected.
6. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect our security and the security of our partners. The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We continue to be confronted by cyber, space, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies.
7. Russia bears full responsibility for its illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which has gravely undermined Euro-Atlantic and global security and for which it must be held fully accountable. We continue to condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s blatant violations of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and OSCE commitments and principles. We do not and will never recognise Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea. There can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, such as attacks against civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure that deprives millions of Ukrainians of basic human services. All those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly against Ukraine’s civilian population, including the forced deportation of children and conflict-related sexual violence. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam highlights the brutal consequences of the war started by Russia. Russia’s war has had a profound impact on the environment, nuclear safety, energy and food security, the global economy, and the welfare of billions of people around the world. Allies are working to enable exports of Ukrainian grain and actively support international efforts to alleviate the global food crisis.
8. Russia must immediately stop this illegal war of aggression, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters. We urge all countries not to provide any kind of assistance to Russia’s aggression and condemn all those who are actively facilitating Russia’s war. Belarus’ support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia’s aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.
9. We welcome the strong support in the UN General Assembly for efforts to promote a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine. We welcome and support President Zelenskyy’s commitment in setting out the principles for such a peace through his Peace Formula. We are committed to achieving a just and lasting peace that upholds the principles of the UN Charter, in particular sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. We underline that this cannot be realised without Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal. While we have called on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations with Ukraine, Russia has not shown any genuine openness to a just and lasting peace.
10. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. We remain steadfast in our commitment to further step up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and will continue our support for as long as it takes. We welcome efforts of all Allies and partners engaged in providing support to Ukraine.
11. We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine’s future is in NATO. We reaffirm the commitment we made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, and today we recognise that Ukraine’s path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan. Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance, and has made substantial progress on its reform path. In line with the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine and the 2009 Complement, Allies will continue to support and review Ukraine’s progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required. NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Programme. The Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.
12. The security of Ukraine is of great importance to Allies and the Alliance. To support Ukraine’s further integration with NATO, today we have agreed a substantial package of expanded political and practical support. We have decided to establish the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new joint body where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal members to advance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. It will provide for joint consultations, decision-making, and activities, and will also serve as a crisis consultation mechanism between NATO and Ukraine.
13. The continued delivery of urgently needed non-lethal assistance to Ukraine by NATO through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) remains a priority. Since the Madrid Summit, Allies and partners have committed over 500 million Euros to the CAP. To support Ukraine’s deterrence and defence in the short, medium, and long term, we have agreed today to further develop the CAP into a multi-year programme for Ukraine. The assistance provided will help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defence sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO. Allies will continue to fund the CAP in a sustained and predictable way. We highly welcome and encourage partner contributions.
14. Russia has increased its multi-domain military build-up and presence in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Sea regions, and maintains significant military capabilities in the Arctic. Russia’s more assertive posture, novel military capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, continue to threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. NATO and Allies will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities, including by exercising relevant plans.
15. Russia’s deepening military integration with Belarus, including the deployment of advanced Russian military capabilities and military personnel in Belarus, has implications for regional stability and the defence of the Alliance. NATO will remain vigilant and further monitor developments closely, in particular the potential deployment of so-called private military companies to Belarus. We call on Belarus to stop its malign activities against its neighbours, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to abide by international law.
16. Russia is modernising its nuclear forces, including its large stockpile of theatre-range weapons, and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems. It is unacceptable that Russia uses such dual-capable systems to attack civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We condemn Russia’s announced intention to deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory, which further demonstrates how Russia’s repeated actions undermine strategic stability and overall security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We condemn Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signalling. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear Weapons States issued on 3 January 2022 on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement.
17. Russia’s actions demonstrate a posture of strategic intimidation and underline the continued need for NATO to monitor all of these developments and adapt its posture as necessary. Allies will continue to work closely together to address the threats and challenges posed by Russia and reiterate that any use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.
18. Russia has intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes interference in democratic processes, political and economic coercion, widespread disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and illegal and disruptive activities of Russian intelligence services. We are enhancing the tools at our disposal to counter Russian hybrid actions and will ensure that the Alliance and Allies are prepared to deter and defend against hybrid attacks.
19. We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and Russia. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. In light of its hostile policies and actions, we cannot consider Russia to be our partner. Any change in our relationship depends on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law. We remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency. At the same time, we will continue to consult on and assess the implications of Russia’s policies and actions for our security, and respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way.
20. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms. Countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is essential to our collective defence. NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance and is integral to the Alliance’s 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity. As part of a broader effort to better respond collectively to this threat, we will further develop Allies’ capabilities, and continue to engage with the Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh and with partner countries in order to support their efforts and to help them build their capacity to counter terrorism. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with other international actors to ensure added value and complementarity.
21. Terrorist organisations threaten the security of our populations, forces and territory. They have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies to improve their reach and lethality. We will continue to deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups, based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures. We have today tasked the Council in permanent session to update NATO’s Policy Guidelines and Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, and reassess, in consultation with our regional partners, the areas where NATO can provide civil-military assistance to partners in this field. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the fight against terrorism.
22. NATO’s southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic, and political challenges. These are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies, and food insecurity. This situation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations. It also enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors. Russia is fuelling tensions and instability across these regions. Pervasive instability results in violence against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence, as well as attacks against cultural property and environmental damage. It contributes to forced displacement, fuelling human trafficking and irregular migration. These trends pose serious transnational and humanitarian challenges and have a disproportionate impact on women, children, and minorities. In response to the profound implications of these threats and challenges within and in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area, we have today tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to launch a comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges, and opportunities for engagements with our partner nations, international organisations, and other relevant actors in the region, to be presented by our next Summit in 2024.
23. The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic, and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC’s malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.
24. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests. We are working together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO’s enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We are boosting our shared awareness, enhancing our resilience and preparedness, and protecting against the PRC’s coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.
25. The deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests. We call on the PRC to play a constructive role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to condemn Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, to abstain from supporting Russia’s war effort in any way, to cease amplifying Russia’s false narrative blaming Ukraine and NATO for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We particularly call on the PRC to act responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia.
26. In 2014, at the Wales Summit Allied Heads of State and Government agreed the Defence Investment Pledge. Since then Allies have made remarkable progress and all have increased their defence spending, developed further their forces and capabilities, and have contributed to Allied operations, missions and activities. However, as the Strategic Concept sets out, our nations are now facing more profound security threats and challenges than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
27. Consistent with our obligations under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, we make an enduring commitment to invest at least 2% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence. We do so recognising more is needed urgently to sustainably meet our commitments as NATO Allies, including to fulfil longstanding major equipment requirements and the NATO Capability Targets, to resource NATO’s new defence plans and force model, as well as to contribute to NATO operations, missions and activities. We affirm that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.
28. We commit to invest at least 20% of our defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development. We recognise this should be met in conjunction with a minimum of 2% of GDP annual defence expenditure. We need to maintain our technological edge, and continue to modernise and reform our forces and capabilities, including through the integration of innovative technologies.
29. We commit to contribute the necessary forces, capabilities and resources to the full range of NATO operations, missions and activities. This includes meeting requirements for deterrence and defence, providing the forces needed to implement NATO’s defence plans and contribute to NATO crisis management operations. Allies will ensure that our forces are ready and have the necessary personnel, equipment, training, spares, logistics, infrastructure, and stockpiles. We commit to improve the interoperability of our national forces, including through transparent compliance with, and further development of, NATO standards and doctrines.
30. To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. Furthermore, consistent with our commitments, obligations and processes, we will reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment among Allies.
31. NATO is the foundation of our collective defence. NATO’s key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. NATO will continue to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. These are complementary to ensure the collective defence and security of all Allies.
32. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond. We are modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence. We are united in our commitment and resolve to prevail against any aggressor and defend every inch of Allied territory.
33. Guided by our sovereign decisions, and in response to the threats we face, we remain vigilant and stand together in solidarity ensuring a substantial and persistent presence of our military forces across the Alliance on land, in the air and at sea, in line with our 360-degree approach. NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. It is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with our international commitments. We will employ military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing.
34. In response to a radically changed security environment, we are strengthening NATO’s collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since 2014, and in particular at the 2022 Madrid Summit, we have taken decisions to strengthen our posture and set a clear trajectory for accelerated military adaptation. Today, we have agreed significant measures to further enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence posture in all domains, including strengthening forward defences and the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will fully implement these measures and deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression. We have:
· Put in place a new generation of regional defence plans, building on our existing strategic and domain-specific plans. Together this family of plans will significantly improve our ability and readiness to deter and defend against any threats, including on short or no notice, and ensure timely reinforcement of all Allies, in line with our 360-degree approach. To a greater extent than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the planning for our collective defence will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control. We have committed to fully resource and regularly exercise these plans to be prepared for high-intensity and multi-domain collective defence.
· Agreed that our defence plans are the main driver for the organisation of our forces and the specific military requirements NATO asks of them, allowing us to respond faster and at a greater scale. With the new NATO Force Model, agreed at the Madrid Summit, Allies are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity. We are also establishing a new multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force, which will provide more options to respond swiftly to threats and crises in all directions. We are committed to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in full.
· Agreed to strengthen NATO’s command and control, to ensure that it is sufficiently agile, resilient and staffed to execute our plans. This will improve our ability to conduct exercises, to manage NATO’s posture in peacetime and in the transition to crisis and conflict, and to undertake command and control for the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale multi-domain operations for collective defence, conducted by SHAPE and its subordinate commands, including the three equally capable Joint Force Commands.
· Reaffirmed our decisions at the Madrid Summit to put in place additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on NATO’s Eastern Flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control. The eight multinational battlegroups are now in place. We will continue our efforts to implement these decisions, including by demonstrating the ability to scale up our military presence through robust live exercises across the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. We welcome ongoing efforts by Allies to increase their presence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, which further adds to credible deterrence and defence. All these forces demonstrate our resolve and readiness to defend every inch of Allied territory.
· Agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence, in particular through regular training and rotational presence of modern air defence systems and capabilities across SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the Eastern Flank, thereby strengthening our deterrence.
· Agreed to continue our work on multi-domain operations, enabled by NATO’s Digital Transformation, which further drives our military and technological advantage, strengthening the Alliance’s ability to operate decisively across the land, air, maritime, cyberspace and space domains.
35. We welcome the rapid progress towards the full integration of Finland into NATO’s deterrence and defence, and have agreed to complete this process as soon as possible.
36. We need a robust and resilient defence industry able to sustainably meet the need of significantly strengthened collective defence. We have endorsed a Defence Production Action Plan, and its action items. This Plan will ensure long-term NATO engagement across the Alliance based on the principles of transparency, equitable treatment and inclusive participation. With this Plan, and in support of Allies’ own priorities, we are committed to leveraging the Alliance’s role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defence industrial capacity. This will be underpinned by a renewed and urgent focus on interoperability and improving materiel standardization to ensure that our forces can operate seamlessly together, with an initial focus on land munitions. The Plan will ensure our understanding of defence industry across the Alliance, including small and medium size enterprises, help aggregate demand to meet NATO’s capability targets, encourage multinational cooperation and more agile procurement, and enhance transparency with industry.
37. Our robust military capabilities are critical for NATO’s deterrence and defence. We continue to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities. These will reflect the requirements of NATO’s defence plans and other tasks. We will ensure that these capabilities are resourced to maintain the required high levels of readiness. We continue to improve the deployability, interoperability, standardisation, responsiveness, force integration and support of our forces in order to conduct and sustain high intensity operations, including crisis response operations, in demanding environments. The NATO Defence Planning Process plays a key role in the sharing of risks and responsibilities, and we reaffirm our commitment to providing our respective shares of the capabilities required by the Alliance to fulfil our three core tasks. Our capability development plans will ensure that we maintain our technological edge, recognising the challenges and opportunities presented by emerging and disruptive technologies, while ensuring their timely integration. We have also decided to significantly increase our stockpiles of certain battle-decisive munitions.
38. We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance’s ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. Exercises are a key way of demonstrating the Alliance’s resolve and capability. We are adapting and streamlining our decision-making processes and improving the effectiveness of our alert and response system.
39. We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. Accordingly, we will strengthen training and exercises that simulate conventional and, for Allies concerned, a nuclear dimension of a crisis or conflict, facilitating greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture across all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict.
40. We have accelerated our efforts, both nationally and in NATO, to ensure the enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, including logistics, and to improve our ability to support the reinforcement and sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory, including through prepositioning of ammunition and equipment. As part of the enablement of SACEUR’s Area of Responsibility, we are taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements, as the timely provision of fuel to NATO’s military forces where required in Europe underpins the Alliance’s readiness and responsiveness. We recognise that the changed security environment represents a more demanding challenge to the Alliance’s collective logistics and we will make political and military efforts to address this challenge, recognising that credible deterrence and defence relies on adequate logistics capability. Effective military mobility is essential for enablement and further progress is required. Efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies between NATO and the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued.
41. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) remains key for credible deterrence and defence, and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. NATO IAMD is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict. NATO IAMD incorporates all measures to contribute to deter any air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness. This mission is conducted in a 360-degree approach, and tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors.
42. Allied IAMD deployments, including those on the Eastern flank in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as exercises and training demonstrate Allied solidarity and resolve. Based on the Strategic Concept, the new baseline for deterrence and defence posture agreed in Madrid in 2022, and the new generation of defence plans, NATO continues to strengthen its IAMD by improving IAMD readiness, responsiveness, effectiveness, and interoperability, as well as availability of airspace. NATO and Allies continue to improve IAMD capabilities, such as surveillance, interceptors, and command and control. We will continue to take into account the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats ranging from simple Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to sophisticated hypersonic missiles.
43. The fundamental purpose of NATO’s nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO’s goal is a safer world for all; we seek to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
44. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies’ separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. National contributions, by Allies concerned, of dual-capable aircraft, as well as the provision of conventional forces and military capabilities in support of NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission, remain central to this effort.
45. NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission. This includes continuing to modernise NATO’s nuclear capability and updating planning to increase flexibility and adaptability of the Alliance’s nuclear forces, while exercising strong political control at all times. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by Allies concerned in NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve.
46. The Alliance is committed to ensuring greater integration and coherence of capabilities and activities across all domains and the spectrum of conflict, while reaffirming the unique and distinct role of nuclear deterrence. NATO will continue to maintain credible deterrence, strengthen its strategic communications, enhance the effectiveness of its exercises and reduce strategic risks. NATO is ready and able to deter aggression and manage escalation risks in a crisis that has a nuclear dimension.
47. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them. The aim and political principles of NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) remain unchanged from the 2010 Lisbon Summit. NATO BMD is purely defensive and is aimed at countering ballistic missile threats emanating from outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies remain committed to the full development of NATO BMD, to pursue the Alliance's collective defence and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
48. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including the US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Türkiye, Spain, and Poland, as well as the NATO BMD command and control, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to completing additional essential components of NATO BMD command and control, which is necessary for achieving the next major milestone before reaching the Full Operational Capability.
49. Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation strongly contribute to the Alliance’s objectives. Allies’ efforts on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation aim to reduce risk and enhance security, transparency, verification, and compliance. We will pursue all elements of strategic risk reduction, including promoting confidence building and predictability through dialogue, increasing understanding, and establishing effective crisis management and prevention tools. These efforts will take the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies into account and complement the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture. We will make use of NATO as a platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts.
50. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance’s security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold and support existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. We will further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies.
51. Russia’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. We condemn Russia’s purported suspension of the New START treaty and failure to comply with its legally-binding obligations under the Treaty. We call on Russia to return to full implementation of the Treaty as well as to act responsibly and engage constructively to reduce strategic and nuclear risks. We also condemn Russia’s decision to withdraw from the landmark Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which further demonstrates Russia’s continued disregard for arms control, and is the latest in a series of actions to undermine Euro-Atlantic security. Allies urge Russia to implement its commitments and obligations, and to use the remaining time before its withdrawal to reconsider its decision. Allies will continue to consult on the implications of Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE Treaty and its impact on the security of the Alliance.
52. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and disarmament architecture, the only credible path to nuclear disarmament, and the framework for international cooperation in sharing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology. Allies remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT across its three pillars, including Article VI. Russia blocking consensus at the Tenth NPT Review Conference was irresponsible. We call on all NPT States Parties to work together to implement and strengthen the NPT in the current NPT Review Cycle. We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. We call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. We call on all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
53. NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, achieved in an effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability and which is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT.
54. We reiterate that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) stands in opposition to and is inconsistent and incompatible with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the ban treaty’s impact on international peace and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on nuclear disarmament.
55. The PRC is rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad, while failing to engage in meaningful transparency or good faith efforts to achieve nuclear arms control or risk reduction. We oppose any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes, which undermines the objectives of the NPT. We urge the PRC to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and to promote stability through greater transparency with regard to its nuclear weapon policies, plans and capabilities.
56. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s escalation of its nuclear programme. We call on Iran to fulfil its legal obligations under its Non-Proliferation Treaty-required safeguards agreement and political commitments regarding nuclear non-proliferation without further delay. The fulfilment by Iran of these obligations and commitments is crucial to allow the IAEA to provide credible assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. We also call on Iran to stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231.
57. We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) WMD and ballistic missile programmes which violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We reiterate that the DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and any other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We urge the DPRK to return to, and fully comply with, the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea.
58. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a central and evolving threat to our security. We are implementing NATO’s new CBRN defence policy, as agreed at the Madrid Summit, and are investing in the military capabilities required to effectively operate, fight and prevail in any environment, and to ensure our national and collective resilience against CBRN risks and threats.
59. NATO safeguards the freedom and security of all its members using both political and military means. The evolving security environment increasingly requires that NATO will take a structured and tailored approach that uses non-military and military tools in a deliberate, coherent, and sustained manner, throughout the full spectrum of peace, crisis and conflict. NATO uses a variety of non-military tools which support the Alliance’s three core tasks. It also continues to serve as a platform for enhancing the coherent use of these tools by Allies, under their own authority and control, and alongside other international actors. We will continue to strengthen effective, clear, and convincing strategic communication.
60. As the war in Europe has fundamentally shifted the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security environment, the emphasis on intelligence has become even more prominent and essential to Alliance decision-making and strategic planning. The value of the NATO intelligence enterprise comes first and foremost from the Allied intelligence and security services working closely together to share intelligence and continue to ensure that the Alliance has a comprehensive understanding of the global strategic picture. To that end, Allies’ intelligence capabilities will contribute to improving NATO’s understanding of the threats, risks and challenges, and to optimising our significant and diverse analysis capabilities. We will strengthen our intelligence cooperation within the Alliance and with partners as appropriate. NATO and Allies will enhance their security and counter-intelligence measures to respond effectively to hostile intelligence activity.
61. National and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values. Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Today we have agreed the 2023 Alliance Resilience Objectives. We build on the 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment. The Resilience Objectives will strengthen NATO and Allied preparedness against strategic shocks and disruptions. They will boost our national and collective ability to ensure continuity of government and of essential services to our populations, and enable civil support to military operations, in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will use these objectives to guide the development of their national goals and implementation plans, consistent with their respective national risk profile. We will also work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. Allies should also promote societal resilience. As we strengthen our efforts to build resilience, we will continue to work with our partners engaged in similar efforts, in particular the European Union, in order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure. The actions, commitments and legal obligations of individual Allies in other international bodies also contribute to enhancing our resilience.
62. The Alliance’s ability to fulfil its core tasks increasingly relies on the adoption of digital technologies. Recognising the urgency of a digitally-transformed Alliance, we have endorsed a Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy to underpin our ability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations, drive interoperability across all domains, enhance situational awareness, political consultation, and employ data-driven decision-making.
63. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance and becoming key arenas of global competition. The operational importance of EDTs as well as of access to and adaptation of commercial technologies in current operations have been highlighted in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. NATO’s strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in technologies that can be highly effective, particularly in malign hybrid activities, and decisive in conflict. We are accelerating our own efforts to ensure that the Alliance maintains its technological edge in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge, including through dual-use solutions. We are working together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards, and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights. We will ensure that we act in accordance with international law and seek to build public trust. NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has now launched its first challenges to start-ups in NATO countries. To further develop our transatlantic innovation ecosystem, the NATO Innovation Fund, the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund, will begin to invest in deep-tech in the coming months. Complementing the recently agreed strategies on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, NATO will develop further strategies for key emerging and disruptive technologies, including on Quantum Technologies and on Biotechnology and Human Enhancement to address the opportunities and risks they present.
64. We continue to face growing hybrid threats and challenges from state and non-state actors, who use hybrid activities, including through interference and the harmful use of technologies, to target our political institutions, our critical infrastructure, our societies, our democratic systems, our economies, and the security of our citizens. We remain united in defending our open and democratic societies against these malign activities. We reiterate that hybrid operations against Allies could reach the level of an armed attack and could lead the Council to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to prepare for, deter, defend against and counter hybrid threats, including by potentially deploying Counter Hybrid Support Teams. We continue to develop comprehensive preventive and response options and stand ready to apply them to enhance resilience and deter malign actors from engaging in hybrid operations. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We will continue to address disinformation and misinformation, including through positive and effective strategic communications. We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.
65. The threat to critical undersea infrastructure is real and it is developing. We are committed to identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies with respect to our critical infrastructure, and to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. Any deliberate attack against Allies’ critical infrastructure will be met with a united and determined response; this applies also to critical undersea infrastructure. The protection of critical undersea infrastructure on Allies’ territory remains a national responsibility, as well as a collective commitment. NATO stands ready to support Allies if and when requested. We have agreed to establish NATO’s Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM). We also agreed to set up a network that brings together NATO, Allies, private sector, and other relevant actors to improve information sharing and exchange best practice.
66. Cyberspace is contested at all times as threat actors increasingly seek to destabilise the Alliance by employing malicious cyber activities and campaigns. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the extent to which cyber is a feature of modern conflict. We are countering the substantial, continuous, and increasing cyber threats, including to our democratic systems and our critical infrastructure, as well as where they are part of hybrid campaigns. We are determined to employ the full range of capabilities in order to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including by considering collective responses. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, on a case-by-case basis. We remain committed to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law as applicable. We continue to promote a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace, and further pursue efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict, by ensuring that international law is respected and by supporting voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Today, we endorse a new concept to enhance the contribution of cyber defence to our overall deterrence and defence posture. It will further integrate NATO’s three cyber defence levels - political, military, and technical - ensuring civil-military cooperation at all times through peacetime, crisis, and conflict, as well as engagement with the private sector, as appropriate. Doing so will enhance our shared situational awareness. Strengthening our cyber resilience is key to making our Alliance more secure and better able to mitigate the potential for significant harm from cyber threats. Today we restate and enhance our Cyber Defence Pledge and have committed to ambitious new national goals to further strengthen our national cyber defences as a matter of priority, including critical infrastructures. We have launched NATO’s new Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC) to support national mitigation efforts in response to significant malicious cyber activities. This provides Allies with an additional tool for assistance. We will further seek to develop mutually beneficial and effective partnerships as appropriate, including with partner countries, international organisations, industry, and academia, furthering our efforts to enhance international stability in cyberspace. Complementing our existing exchanges, we will hold the first comprehensive NATO Cyber Defence Conference in Berlin this November, bringing together decision-makers across the political, military, and technical levels.
67. Space plays a critical role for the security and prosperity of our nations. Space is also an increasingly contested domain, marked by irresponsible behaviour, malicious activities, and the growth of counterspace capabilities by NATO’s potential adversaries and strategic competitors. Maintaining secure use and unfettered access to space is key to effective deterrence and defence. As part of our work on space as an operational domain, we are accelerating the integration of space into planning, exercising and executing joint and multi-domain operations in peacetime, crisis, and conflict in order to ensure space effects are coordinated across all domains. We have committed to enhancing the sharing of our space data, products and services within NATO in support of the Alliance’s requirements and defence plans. We welcome the ongoing efforts on the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) multinational programme, which will improve NATO’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity. We welcome the establishment of the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France. Allies are committed to upholding international law and we will continue to support international efforts to reduce space threats by promoting norms, rules, and principles of responsible space behaviours. We reaffirm that hostile operations to, from, or within space could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
68. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. The energy crisis intentionally exacerbated by Russia has underlined the importance of a stable and reliable energy supply and the diversification of routes, suppliers, and sources. We will continue to develop NATO’s capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical energy infrastructure. We are committed to ensuring secure, resilient, and sustainable energy supplies to our military forces. As we adapt our Alliance to the ongoing energy transition, we will ensure military capability, effectiveness and interoperability. Allies are seeking and will continue to seek diversification of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions.
69. Climate change is a defining challenge with a profound impact on Allied security facing present and future generations. It remains a threat multiplier. NATO is committed to becoming the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. We will continue to address the impact of climate change on defence and security, including through the development of innovative strategic analysis tools. We will integrate climate change considerations into all of NATO’s core tasks, adapt our infrastructure, military capabilities and technologies ensuring resilience to future operating environments. To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, we are committed to significantly cutting greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities; we will also contribute to combatting climate change by improving energy efficiency, transitioning to clean energy sources, and leveraging innovative next-generation clean technologies, while ensuring military effectiveness and a credible deterrence and defence posture. We will continue to strengthen our exchanges with partner countries, the scientific community, as well as other international and regional organisations that are active on climate change and security. We welcome the establishment of a NATO Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security in Montreal.
70. We are committed to integrating the Human Security and the Women, Peace and Security agendas across all our core tasks. We will continue to work towards fully operationalising this objective, through robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in order to enhance our operational effectiveness and ensure synergies between the civilian and military structures. In doing so, we are working with partners, international organisations, and civil society. We reaffirm our commitment to an ambitious human security agenda. Our Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles allows us to develop a more comprehensive view of the human environment, contributing to lasting peace and security. Today, we endorse a NATO Policy on Children and Armed Conflict, and an updated Policy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings. Our ongoing work on human security also includes cultural property protection.
71. We recognise the critical importance of women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability, noting the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls, including through conflict-related sexual violence. We will consistently continue to implement our Policy on Women, Peace and Security, and, in this context, we will advance gender equality and integrate gender perspectives and foster the principles of the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out by the UN Security Council in all that we do, including in NATO operations, missions, activities, and our work on emerging challenges. We will assess and update NATO’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security.
72. NATO’s partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. They play an important role in supporting NATO’s three core tasks and our 360-degree security approach. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contributions to NATO’s situational awareness, operations, missions, and activities, including Trust Fund projects. The current security environment highlights the significance of partnerships. They are crucial to protect the global commons and enhance our resilience. We will strengthen our ties with partners that share the Alliance’s values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order. We will continue to strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners, based on mutual respect, benefit and interest of both Allies and partners. This contributes to stability beyond our borders and enhances our security at home. We will increase outreach to countries in our broader neighbourhood and across the globe and remain open to engagement with any country or organisation, when doing so could bolster our mutual security. We remain committed to the principles underpinning our relations with our partners, and have taken steps to make our partnerships more strategic, more coherent and more effective. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges where NATO's interests are affected, share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to address shared security concerns. In line with our Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO’s own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.
73. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Our strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area. It is built on our shared values, our determination to tackle common challenges and our unequivocal commitment to promote and safeguard peace, freedom and prosperity. NATO recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. Such efforts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities, and support an overall increase in defence spending. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU’s efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. We reaffirm in their entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen this partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations.
74. In the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, NATO-EU cooperation has become more significant. We have unequivocally demonstrated unity of purpose and common resolve in leveraging our complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles. NATO and EU will continue to support Ukraine. In this respect, we welcome the establishment of the dedicated NATO-EU Staff Coordination on Ukraine. We have also achieved tangible results in strategic communications, including the fight against disinformation, countering hybrid and cyber threats, exercises, operational cooperation, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building. We are further expanding our cooperation on resilience, protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, security implications of climate change, and geostrategic competition. We will also continue to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance NATO-EU cooperation.
75. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO as highlighted by our long history of cooperation and operations. We remain strongly committed to the security and stability of the Western Balkans by supporting reforms that advance the respective NATO and EU aspirations of the countries in the region. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation in order to support reforms, regional peace and security, and counter malign influence, including disinformation, hybrid, and cyber threats, posed by both state and non-state actors. The region requires continued attention and commitment from the Alliance and the international community to counter these challenges. Democratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and we look to continued progress in this regard.
76. NATO strongly supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements. We encourage domestic reconciliation, and urge political leaders to refrain from divisive and secessionist rhetoric and actions. We remain committed to the country’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We continue to support reform efforts, including through the newly agreed Defence Capacity Building package, NATO HQ Sarajevo, and wide-ranging cooperative security and partnership tools, and through the country’s Reform Programme with NATO. We encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina to take advantage of NATO’s support and intensify efforts to make progress on reforms in key areas, including the much-needed political, electoral, rule of law, economic, and defence reforms, without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership.
77. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations would be of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We look to Serbia to engage with NATO and its neighbours in a constructive manner, including in its public communications on the mutual benefits of NATO-Serbia cooperation. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and other efforts aimed at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the sides to seize the moment and engage in good faith towards reaching a lasting political solution. We call on both sides to immediately de-escalate, return to dialogue, and engage constructively in implementing the agreement on the path to normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina reached recently in Brussels and Ohrid.
78. We remain committed to NATO’s continued engagement in Kosovo, including through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR will continue to provide a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo in line with UNSC Resolution 1244. The recent escalatory actions are unacceptable and we condemn the violence in northern Kosovo as well as the unprovoked attacks that caused serious injuries to NATO soldiers. We have increased KFOR’s troop presence to respond to the recurrent tensions. Any changes to our force posture in KFOR will remain conditions-based and not calendar driven.
79. The Black Sea region is of strategic importance for the Alliance. This is further highlighted by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. We underline our continued support to Allied regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region including, as appropriate, through the 1936 Montreux Convention. We will further monitor and assess developments in the region and enhance our situational awareness, with a particular focus on the threats to our security and potential opportunities for closer cooperation with our partners in the region, as appropriate.
80. We reiterate our support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We stand firm in our support for Georgia’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. We call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in Georgia without its consent. We further call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia; to end the militarisation of these regions and continued attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the construction of border-like obstacles; and to cease the human rights violations and abuses, including arbitrary detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens. We highly appreciate Georgia’s substantial contributions to NATO operations, which demonstrate its commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We remain committed to making full use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP) in deepening political dialogue and practical cooperation with Georgia. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. We welcome the progress made in implementing the enhanced Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, including Crisis Management, Cyber Security, Military Engineering, and Secure Communications, as well as new initiatives in the areas of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence and Training Facilities. To advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, Georgia must make progress on reforms, including key democratic reforms, and make best use of the ANP.
81. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and call on Russia to withdraw all of its forces stationed in the Transnistrian region without Moldova’s consent. We stand firm in our support for Moldova’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference, and fully respect Moldova’s constitutional neutrality. NATO is stepping up political and practical support to strengthen its resilience and uphold its political independence in light of the deteriorating security environment. Allies welcome Moldova’s efforts to promote democratic reforms and are committed to supporting Moldova as it advances its European integration. NATO will continue to provide practical assistance through the enhanced Defence Capacity Building Package, as Moldova works to strengthen its security and defence capabilities and modernise its Armed Forces.
82. The Middle East and Africa are regions of strategic interest. We will deepen our political engagements and public diplomacy outreach to our long-standing partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will also increase our outreach to relevant regional organisations, including the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. We are implementing the Defence Capacity Building packages for Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia. We will also explore with the Jordanian authorities the possibility of establishing a NATO Liaison Office in Amman.
83. NATO and Allies remain committed in our support to Iraq and its ability to stabilise the country. We recognise the continued efforts and progress of the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces to combat ISIS/Da’esh. We encourage further progress in Iraq’s fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Our NATO Mission Iraq continues to deliver non-combat advisory and capacity building support to the Iraqi security institutions in the greater Baghdad area, and has deepened collaboration with Iraq’s Ministry of Defence. Based on the request from the Iraqi government, we are considering broadening NATO Mission Iraq, by evolving it to provide advice to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior on its Federal Police. NATO Mission Iraq will continue to be demand-driven, and will be carried out with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, in full respect of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in close coordination with relevant partners and international actors.
84. Iran’s support to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has an impact on Euro-Atlantic security. We call upon Iran to cease its military support to Russia, in particular its transfer of Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) which have been used to attack critical infrastructure, causing widespread civilian casualties. We express our serious concern over Iran’s malicious activities within Allied territory. We also call upon Iran to refrain from destabilising actions, including seizures of maritime vessels, and to play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.
85. The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the contribution of our partners in the Asia-Pacific region – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to security in the Euro-Atlantic, including their commitment to supporting Ukraine. We will further strengthen our dialogue and cooperation to tackle our shared security challenges, including on cyber defence, technology and hybrid, underpinned by our shared commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based international order.
86. NATO’s engagement with other international and regional organisations, including the United Nations, the OSCE, and the African Union, contributes to international security. We will strengthen these interactions to advance our shared interests. We are exploring the possibility of establishing a Liaison Office in Geneva to further strengthen our engagement with the United Nations and other relevant international organisations.
87. We will ensure that our political decisions are adequately resourced. We will build on the progress made to ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order.
88. We pay tribute to all women and men who work tirelessly for our collective security, honour all those who have paid the ultimate price or have been wounded to keep us safe, and their families.
89. NATO remains the strongest Alliance in history. As in the past, we will stand the test of time in safeguarding the freedom and security of our Allies and contributing to peace and security.
90. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Republic of Lithuania. We look forward to meeting again for the Alliance’s 75th anniversary in Washington, D.C. in 2024, followed by a meeting in the Netherlands in 2025.
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